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TEXT OF CONTROLLING STATUTES
"Water corporation" includes every corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, and
receivers, owning, controlling, operating, or
managing any water system for public service
within this state. It does not include private irrigation companies engaged in distributing water only to their stockholders, or
towns, cities, counties, water conservancy
districts, improvement districts, or other
governmental units created or organized under
any general or special law of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(34)
Water, sewer, gas, electricity, telephone and
public transportation — Service beyond city
limits — Retainage escrow.
(1) They may construct, maintain and operate
waterworks, sewer collection, sewer treatment
systems, gas works, electric light works,
telephone lines or public transportation systems, or authorize the construction, maintenance and operation of the same by others, or
purchase or lease such works or systems from
any person or corporation, and they may sell
and deliver the surplus product or service
capacity of any such works, not required by
the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond
the limits of the city.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14 (1992)

-vi-

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over final orders issued by
the Public

Service Commission

Code

§

Ann.

("Commission*') pursuant to Utah

78-2-2(3)(e)(i).

Appellant/Petitioner

contests

jurisdiction, however, on the grounds that the order from which
it appeals, which the Commission has declared is a final order,
is not final.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

DOES THE COMMISSION HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR
STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION
OVER SANDY'S SALE OF WATER TO NON-RESIDENTS?

II.

DID THE COMMISSION'S ORDER DEPRIVE SANDY CITY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS BY DENYING
SANDY CITY THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO THE DETERMINATION MADE BY
THE COMMISSION?

III. IS THE COMMISSION'S ORDER A FINAL ORDER DISPOSING
OF
ALL
THE
ISSUES
BEFORE
THE
COMMISSION?
This issue includes the following sub-issues.
a.

IS THE COMMISSION'S ORDER ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS IN PURPORTING TO MAKE FINDINGS OF
FACT WHEN NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO IT?

b.

IS THE COMMISSION'S ORDER ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE IT IS CONTRARY TO THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT WOULD BE PRESENTED TO
IT IN AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING?

C.

DID THE COMMISSION ERR IN BIFURCATING THE
ISSUE OF APPROVAL OF THE CONTRACT FROM ITS
DECLARATION OF JURISDICTION?
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STANDARD OP APPELLATE REVIEW
The Public Service Commission issued an Order which is
attached hereto as Addendum 1 declaring it had jurisdiction to
regulate the rates charged by Sandy City for the sale of water to
non-residents.

The Order was issued without any evidentiary

hearing and is based on the Commission's interpretation of constitutional

and

statutory

law.

The appropriate

standard of

review for questions of law is de novo review without deference
to the Commission's decision.

MCI v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 186

Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1992); Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991); Morton Intern. Inc. v. Auditing
Div., 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991).
NATURE OF THE CASE
Petitioners White City Water Company and Sandy City
appeal from an Order issued by the Commission declaring that the
Commission has jurisdiction over a municipality to regulate the
rates charged by the municipality for providing water to residents living outside its boundaries.
Commission

In issuing this Order, the

severed the jurisdictional

issue addressed by the

Order from the original petition filed by White City Water Company ("White City") for approval by the Commission of a Contract
of Sale of the stock of White City to the Municipal Building
Authority of Sandy City (the "Building Authority").
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
White City, a water utility, applied for approval by
the Commission of an agreement by which all of its stock would be
sold to the Building Authority.

The application requested deter-

mination by the Coinmission that upon consummation of the proposed
transaction, subsequent ownership by the Building Authority and
operation of the water system by Sandy City would no longer be
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.
White City Water Users, Salt Lake County and Sandy City
filed petitions to

intervene

in this matter.

The

Commission

allowed the intervention of these parties and directed the parties to submit legal memoranda concerning the Commission's jurisdiction subsequent to the sale if the sale were approved.

With-

out allowing the parties to present evidence and without conducting any formal proceedings, and over the objections of Sandy City
and White City, the Commission issued the Order purporting to
find that it would have jurisdiction over Sandy's sale of water
to

non-Sandy

residents.

More

specifically,

the

Commission's

Order first purported to sever the issue of approval of the sale
from what it characterized as the jurisdictional issue and then
ruled that it would have jurisdiction if the sale were found to
be in the public interest.

Sandy City and White City seek review

of that Order.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On November 4, 1991, White City filed an applica-

tion advising the Commission that it had entered into an agreement with Scindy City and the Building Authority to sell all of
its stock to the Building Authority.
lease and operate the water system.

Sandy City would then
The application which is

attached hereto as Addendum 2, informed the Commission that the
geographic area served by White City was contiguous to and partly
within Sandy City and within an unincorporated area of Salt Lake
County.

The application stated that Sandy City's water system

had facilities that were fully sufficient to provide storage and
pressure to Sandy City's existing customers as well as to the
customers of White City.
2.

R. 0081.

The application noted that White City had water

rights that were ordinarily sufficient to give adequate and continuous water service to its customers.

White City, however,

lacks adequate facilities to store water at sufficient elevation
to provide pressure to serve its customers.

Additionally, White

City lacks sufficient storage and delivery capacity to meet prolonged emergency in the case of an emergency draw down.

Cur-

rently, although these deficiencies are being mitigated by purchasing water from the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, there is no guarantee that needed emergency capacity will
be available.

White City has been unable to construct additional

storage and distribution facilities to provide adequate pressure

-4-

for anticipated emergency situations.

The application notes that

even if White City does obtain permission to build such facilities, it will need to expend money beyond its present resources.
Consequently, White City would have to borrow funds for such a
construction which would result in substantially higher rates for
its customers.
3.

R. 0081-83.
The application stated that the water systems of

White City and Sandy City are well matched for efficiencies to
result from the proposed integration.

The application noted that

approval of the agreement is in the public interest in that it
would result in better service to all customers of White City and
Sandy City in the foreseeable future.
4.

R. 0084.

On November 7, 1991, Sandy City sought permission

to intervene and in late November, 1991, White City water users
petitioned to intervene.

On December 9, 1991, the Commission

held a prehearing and granted the proposed intervention of Sandy
City and White City water users.

R. 0003.

At the December 9th

prehearing, the Commission also scheduled briefing on the issue
of the scope of the Commissions jurisdiction in approving or
disapproving White City water.

A hearing was scheduled for Feb-

ruary 18, 1992. R. 0171.
5.

Subsequently, on January 10, 1992, the Commission

issued a pre-hearing order.

The Commission set out the dates for

the scheduled briefing and discovery, stating that "although this
docket is obstensibly about the sale of the outstanding shares of

-5-

Applicant to Sandy City, an issue of broader concern surfaced
having to do with the authority of Commission once the sale is
consummated to regulate the rates cheirged and service provided to
certain Applicants customers who reside outside the municipal
boundaries of Sandy City."
6.

R. 0164-165.

The January 10, 1992 Order did not suggest the

Commission's intent to separate the issue of jurisdiction from
the issue of approval of the agreement.
7.

R. 0164-166.

Prior to the hearing set for February 18, 1992,

and without giving the parties an opportunity to present evidence, the Commission determined that it would describe the case
as having two issues; (1) whether the sale was in the public
interest, and (2) whether the Commission would have jurisdiction
if the sale were approved.

Additionally, the Commission unilat-

erally determined that it would issue an Order declaring it would
retain jurisdiction over the sale of water to former White City
customers who were not Sandy residents.

At the hearing before

the Commission on February 18, 1992, Chairman Stewart stated:
If I may first give a little history of why
we are here today. Following the hearing in
this matter, or prehearing in this matter
s€iveral months ago, the Commission in that
hearing ordered that briefs would be filed on
the question of the legal authority of the
Commission.
Following submission of those briefs, the
Commission reached a preliminary conclusion
that it would exercise jurisdiction over rate
payers affected by this purchase if the purchase was to go forth.

-6-

A week ago Friday, on February 7th, at the
request of the attorneys in this case, an
informal meeting was held in the Chairman's
office in which the original question of what
should be intended for today7s hearing, [sic]
At that time, we communicated to the attorneys that we had made that preliminary decision and indicated to them that they then had
the option of appearing here today for oral
argument, recognizing the Commission initial
decision.
They could appear today to have a prehearing
to schedule this matter further and several
other options were discussed.
We did not
hear anything from the attorneys and about
the middle of last week, the Commission
approved an order prepared by our Administrative Judge Thurman which order states that we
intend to exercise the jurisdiction that we
had indicated to the attorneys in the previous meeting would be the case. . . .
So the purpose of today's hearing is simply
to hear oral argument on the legal issues
that were presented in the briefs and following this hearing, the Commission will determine whether or not we have been swayed to
alter the preliminary order which was signed
last week. If not, it will then be up to the
parties to determine where we go from here.
R. 0023-25.
8.

At

the

February

18, 1992 hearing, White City

objected to the Commission's issuing of an order prior to a consideration of the facts at issue, by stating:
[E]ven in the case of a declaratory judgment,
there must be a case in controversy and the
opinion laid against the background of the
factual situation in the case.
You haven't done that here yet.
You have
seen some pleading and that's all. It is our
feeling that if you do this in a vacuum, not
against the back drop of any particular set
of facts, you will be departing from the
-7-

entire tradition, the common law so far as
decision making is concerned.
R. 0027.
9.

Additionally, White City pointed out to the Com-

mission that there was currently before the Legislature a bill
that would grant jurisdiction to the Commission where a city
served non-residents, belying the Commission's conclusion that
the government statutory framework gave the Commission jurisdiction.

R. 0028.
10.

White City also told the Commission that although

White City water users currently had one of the lowest rates for
water in the entire state, partially due to the age of the system, White City Water Company was constructed at a time when
costs were lower.

Consequently, much of the White City system is

fully depreciated on the books and although the rate base is just
over $1 million, the system could not be reproduced today for
less than $15 million.

White City noted that within the next

five years, White City would have to invest over $3.5 million to
replace old pipes and to solve storage and pressure problems.
The costs of these improvements would result in an increase in
rates

to

a

level

non-residents.
11.

above

any

rate which

Sandy

would

charge

R. 003 0.
White

City

represented

to the

Commission

that

although it could handle one or two home fires, it could not handle more complex fire emergencies, such as a shopping center,
with its current facilities.

White City urged the Commission to
-8-

approve the contract for safety reasons and to allow for continued good water service to the Community.
12.

R. 0031.

White City also noted that it would be in the pub-

lic interest for White City to consolidate with another system
and that Sandy City's system was the most appropriate for consolidation.

R. 0032.
13.

Sandy City argued that the Commission could not

determine whether it had jurisdiction unless the Commission first
heard the factual background concerning the the sale of White
City stock to Sandy City.

Specifically, Sandy City argued that

the evidentiary hearings on the public interest question would
address the same evidence necessary to determine if the Commission could constitutionally assert jurisdiction.

Sandy City,

therefore, urged the Commission not to issue an order on jurisdiction without facts to support its legal conclusions, stating:
[I]f you issue [the order] without a factual
framework against which to judge the extent
of jurisdiction, [it will] place all cities
at risk with respect to the extent to which
they are submitting themselves to jurisdiction of the Commission. That is simply something that needs to be explained against the
factual framework.
R. 0037, 0039.

Sandy City noted that if the Commission was going

to consider jurisdiction, "it need[ed] to do so with a full factual hearing in order to decide whether the ground to be broken
[was] appropriate."

R. 0040.

Sandy City reiterated that the

question of jurisdiction "should be addressed in a full factual
hearing."

R. 0041.
-9-

14.

The

Commission

refused

to

hearing on the issue of jurisdiction.

hold

an

evidentiary

Instead, the Commission

assigned a separate docket number to the jurisdiction issue and
severed that issue from White City's application for approval of
its agreement with Sandy City.
15.

Although

the

R. 0355.

Commission

purported

to

sever

the

jurisdictional question from the original application, the Commission has not established a separate file for the two proceedings or otherwise dealt with the "severed" cases as separate matters.

See Record as a whole.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
White City sought approval from the Commission for the

sale of all its stock to the Building Authority and for a determination by the commission that if the sale was completed, the
Commission would no longer have jurisdiction over the water system.

Before any evidence was presented, and over the objections

of the parties, the Commission issued an order which: (1) severed
the issue of jurisdiction from the issue of approval of the sale;
(2)

gave

the

jurisdiction

issue

a

new

docket

number;

and

(3) declared that the Commission would have subsequent jurisdiction.

For the reasons set forth below, the Commission's Order

should be vacated and the case should be remanded to the Commission for an evidentiary hearing.
First, under existing constitutional law, statutory law
and

controlling

case

law,

the

-10-

Commission

does

not

have

jurisdiction over cities which sell water to non-residents.

To

the contrary, cities have statutory authority to sell surplus
water to non-residents.

In fact, Utah's Constitution prohibits

state agencies such as the

Commission from regulating cities

performing a municipal function.

Under controlling case law,

service of water to non-residents constitutes a municipal function.

Furthermore, even if the analysis set forth in West Jordan

v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530 (Utah 1988) applies to
the sale of water, the Commission utterly failed to perform the
factual analysis set out in West Jordan.

Instead, the Commission

relied on its beliefs, surmise, suspicions and unsupported conclusions, without any basis in fact to make its decision.
Second, the Commission's order denies the parties their
constitutional right to due process.

The order, which was writ-

ten before any evidence was presented, is not based on factual
findings.

The Commission decided this issue in a factual vacuum

without reference to the actual facts concerning the application.
Furthermore, the Commission's order which severed the issues
without adequate

notice to the parties, and which was issued

without any evidence, denies White City and Sandy City of their
constitutional due process rights to notice and a fair hearing.
Third, the Commission's order, which does not address
the question of whether it will approve the sale, is not a final
appealable order.
City's

application

The Commission currently has before it White
for

approval

-11-

of

the

sale

of

its stock.

Presumably, the Commission will go forward and schedule hearings
on whether the sale is in the public interest.

Many of the facts

at these hearings will be relevant to the jurisdiction issue.
Indeed, absent approval of the application, jurisdiction is not
an issue.

Under the terms of the agreement, the sale is condi-

tional on the jurisdictional issue.

Clearly, these issues arise

out of the same operational facts.

Under the standards set out

by this Court relating to finality, this appeal should be dismissed because the order in question, though specifically reciting that it was final, did not resolve the present application.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER MUNICIPAL WATER SYSTEMS THAT SERVE NON-CITY
RESIDENTS.
White City appropriately sought approval of its agree-

ment

to

sell

all

its

stock

to

the

Building

Authority

and

requested determination by the Commission that upon consummation
of the proposed transaction, subsequent ownership by the Building
Authority and operation of the water system by Sandy City would
not be subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.
The Commission's Order, after purporting to sever the
issue of approval of the transfer of stock of White City to the
Building Authority, determined that the Commission would have
jurisdiction over whatever entity served White City customers
residing outside the boundaries of Sandy City.

More specifi-

cally,

White

the

Commission's

Order

states

-12-

that

if

City's

application for approval of its proposed agreement with Sandy
City is approved, the Commission would have jurisdiction to regulate rates charged by Sandy City to non-city customers.
As demonstrated by this Brief, it is difficult to separate the substantive argument over whether the Commission can
assert jurisdiction over municipalities which serve non-residents
from the due process and finality arguments made later in this
Brief.

This difficulty stems from the fact that the Commission

purports to make findings of fact without ever having taken any
evidence in this matter.

In fact, a review of the enumerated

findings of fact indicates that they bear no relation to the
ultimate conclusions made by the Commission.

Indeed, the Commis-

sion's own language demonstrates that these conclusions are supported only by the Commission's speculation with respect to the
parties' merit and not by the stated findings of fact.
Under the current law, the Commission either clearly
does not have statutory or constitutional ability to exercise
jurisdiction over a municipality or, if it does, it may do so
only under the detailed "weighing" of stated criteria as enunciated in the West Jordan and UAMPS cases.

In fact, the various

factors enunciated in the West Jordan case would be implicit to a
determination of whether the sale is in the public interest, a
matter which the Commission has kept before it.

Consequently,

either the Commission clearly exceeded its statutory and constitutional authority or the Commission committed procedural error
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by attempting to separate the jurisdiction from the public interest determination when both involve the same set of evidentiary
facts.
A.

STATUTORY LAW AND CONTROLLING CASE LAW PROHIBIT
THE COMMISSION FROM EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER
SANDY CITY'S SALE OF SURPLUS WATER TO NON-RESIDENT
CUSTOMERS.

The Commission is a creature of the legislature and has
only those powers specifically delegated to it by statute.
stated

in Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 P.2d

41

As

(Utah

1988), any doubt about the existence of power by the Commission
must be resolved against the Commission.

Id. at 50.

by this Court:
Where a "'specific power is conferred by
statute upon a tribunal, board or commission
with limited powers, the powers are limited
to such as are specifically mentioned.'"
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
103 Utah 186, 197, 134 P.2d 469, 474 (1943)
(quoting Bamberger Elec. R.R. Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 59 Utah 351, 364, 204 P. 314,
320 (1922)). All powers retained by the PSC
are derived from and created by statute. The
PSC has no inherent regulatory powers and can
only assert those which are expressly granted
or clearly implied as necessary to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities
imposed upon it. Basin Flying Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 531 P. 2d 1303, 1305 (Utah
1975).
To ensure that the administrative
powers of the PSC are not overextended, "any
reasonable doubt of the existence of any
power must be resolved against the exercise
thereof." Public Serv. Comm'n v. Formal Complaint of WWZ Co., 641 P.2d 183, 186 (Wyo.
1982) .
Id. (emphasis added).
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As stated

In t h i s

instance,

the

Commission's

limited to regulation of "public u t i l i t i e s . "

jurisdiction

is

By definition a

public u t i l i t y includes a "water corporation" . . . "where the
service
public

i s performed for,
generally."

definition,
public

§

or the commodity delivered t o ,

54-2-1(19)(a).

A city,

by

statutory

i s not a water corporation and, therefore,

utility.1

See

Utah

Code

Ann.

§54-2-1(34)

not a
("'water

corporation 7 includes every corporation and person . . .
does not include . . . towns, c i t i e s , . . .

the

and i t

or other governmental

units created or organized under any general or special law of
t h i s state.")
(Utah 1986)

Thompson v.

Salt Lake Corp. , 724 P.2d 958, 595

("a municipal corporation

operate water works.
as a public u t i l i t y ,

. . .

i s authorized to

However, i t does not engage in the a c t i v i t y
but i s

specifically

excluded

from that

1

The B u i l d i n g A u t h o r i t y i s not s u b j e c t
t o the
Commission's
jurisdiction either.
The terms "water c o r p o r a t i o n " and " c o r p o r a t i o n " as
defined i n Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 exclude not only c i t i e s and towns b u t any
"governmental u n i t c r e a t e d under [a] g e n e r a l or s p e c i a l law of t h i s s t a t e . "
As a c r e a t u r e of the Utah Municipal B u i l d i n g A u t h o r i t y Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 17A-3-901 e t s e q . , the B u i l d i n g A u t h o r i t y f a l l s o u t s i d e d e f i n i t i o n of a
water c o r p o r a t i o n .
Furthermore, the Act s p e c i f i c a l l y exempts t h e B u i l d i n g
A u t h o r i t y and t h e p r o j e c t s i t a c q u i r e s (such as the White C i t y water s y s t e m ) ,
from Commission j u r i s d i c t i o n .
S p e c i f i c a l l y , Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-914(3)
provides:
(3)
No board, commission, or agency of t h e
s t a t e , i n c l u d i n g the Utah P u b l i c Service Commission,
s h a l l have any j u r i s d i c t i o n over b u i l d i n g a u t h o r i t i e s
or p r o j e c t s .
In sum, b o t h by t h e l i m i t e d n a t u r e of i t s own a u t h o r i t y and by express
l e g i s l a t i v e e x c l u s i o n , t h e Commission has no a u t h o r i t y over t h e B u i l d i n g
Authority.
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status,")

Clearly, the Commissions statutory authority does not

extend to regulation of water service provided by a municipality.
Sandy City is not a "water company" and, therefore, is not a
"public utility" or a "corporation" subject to the Commission's
jurisdiction.
Indeed, the Commission concedes it has no statutory
authority to assert jurisdiction over Sandy City in the order
itself.

The order states:
While there may be no explicit statutory
authority for us to assume jurisdiction, the
obvious remedy for the abuse of extra territorial customers is for us to continue to
regulate their rates; otherwise, to meet the
Court's concern, the instant proposal would
have to be found ultra vires.

Order at p. 14.
The Commission ignores its own concession that it has
no statutory authority and tries to bootstrap itself into authority by claiming that Sandy City's authority is also limited.
Sandy City's authority, however, has no relevance to the issue of
the Commission's authority.

Even if Sandy City were to engage in

ultra vires activity, the result would not be an expansion of the
Commission's jurisdiction.

Rather, Sandy city would be subject

to appropricite court order enjoining such activity.

In sum, the

district courts, not the Commission, possess general jurisdiction
to resolve disputes under Utah law.
The Commission cannot expand its jurisdiction to fill
what it perceives to be a gap in its statutory authorization.
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Indeed, the absence of continuing jurisdiction could presumably
be one of the issues the Commission considers in determining
whether the sale is in the public interest, along with other
evidence concerning whether the sale is in the public interest•
It is inappropriate and unnecessary, however, for the Commission
to assert jurisdiction where the statutes provide none, in order
to prevent this sale from proceeding.

Instead, the Commission

should fully evaluate the applications long term impact on the
public interest and rule accordingly.
The Commission's order relies on North Salt Lake v. St.
Joseph Water & Irr. Co.. 118 Utah 600, 223 P. 2d 577 (Utah 1950)
to

extend

its

jurisdiction

service to non-residents.

over

rate

regulation

of

Sandy's

In this regard, however, the Commis-

sion misreads the facts and the holding of North Salt Lake.

In

North Salt Lake, the newly-formed town of North Salt Lake had
condemned what was previously a privately-owned water system.
Owners of certain residential lots outside the town who had
intended to hook onto the water system when it was private sought
a determination

that the newly-formed

provide water to them.

town was obligated to

The court rejected those claims stating,

that there was no binding obligation upon the owner of the water
system that encumbered the system itself.

The court based its

ruling, in part, on a determination made by the Commission prior
to the condemnation that the water company was neither obligated
nor permitted to provide water service to additional customers.
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This determination, which was made when the Commission did have
jurisdiction, was based on the fact that the lack of available
water might prevent the water company from serving its existing
customers.

The Commission, however, did not rule that the town

was prohibited from serving additional customers, merely that the
additional customers could not claim a binding obligation that
encumbered

the

water

system.

Contrary

to

the

Commissions

reading of the case, the court did not suggest that the Public
Service Commission or its orders had, or would have, an ongoing
jurisdiction on the operation of the water system by the Commission.
Similarly, the Commission cites Oranqebercr v. Moss, 262
S.C. 299, 204 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 1974) for the proposition that the
Commission has jurisdiction to regulate a municipality operating
outside its boundaries.

Like its reliance on North Salt Lake,

the Commission7s reliance on Orangeberg is misplaced.

As the

Commission cidmits, South Carolina has legislation specifically
empowering

their

public

service

extra-territorial service.

commission

to

regulate

In contrast, Utah has legislation

that excludes such regulation and, therefore, the holding in
Orangeburg simply does not apply.
B.

THE COMMISSION IS PROHIBITED BY UTAH'S CONSTITUTION FROM EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER SANDY
CITY'S MUNICIPAL FUNCTIONS.

The

Commission

interfering

with

Sandy

is

constitutionally

City's

activities
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as

prohibited

from

a municipality.

Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "the Legislature will not delegate to any special commission . . . any power to make, supervise or interfere
with

any municipal

improvement, money, property

or effects,

whether held in trust or otherwise . . . or to perform any municipal functions." Utah Const. Article VI, § 28.
The

provision

of

water

services

to

non-residents constitutes a municipal function.

residents

and

Additionally,

cities are statutorily authorized to provide surplus water outside of their boundaries.

Indeed, the legislature has stated

that cites "may construct, maintain and operate water works
. . . or lease such works . . . from any person or corporation,
and they may sell and deliver the surplus product or service
capacity of any such works, not required by the city or its
inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the city."

Utah Code

Ann. § 10-8-14 (1992).
The provision

from the Utah Code quoted

above was

interpreted in County Water System v. Salt Lake City. 3 Utah 2d
46, 278 P.2d 285 (1954) where the Utah Supreme Court specifically
held that Salt Lake City had authority to sell its surplus water
beyond the city limits, that such sales were a municipal function, and that such sales were not subject to Commission jurisdiction.

On the basis of Section 10-8-14, the Court held:
Such sale of surplus water, being authorized by law [Section 10-8-14] as a municipal
function, is as much a municipal function as
the supplying of water within the city limits, and disposing of the surplus outside its
-19-

limits as permitted by statute does not
change its character as a municipality; nor
does the ownership and management of the necessary facilities beyond the city boundaries
change such property to anything other than
municipal property.
County Water Systems, 278 P.2d at 290, Thusf the Court held that
Salt Lake City was not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction
in selling surplus water outside its corporate boundaries and
that

the

constitutional

provision

which

is now

Article VI,

Section 28, precluded any grant of authority to the Commission
over Salt Lake City's operation of its water system.

See also

Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119, 121-22 (Utah
1977),

(Salt Lake City's "business in furnishing water to its

residents and activities reasonably incidental thereto is not
subject to regulation by the Public Service Commission").
Sandy City asserts, and because no facts have been
raised to refute it, it must be assumed, that acquisition and
operation of the White City system is incidental to its overall
provision of general water service deslivery to its own residents.
Because White City is located in the middle of Sandy City's
service area, integration of the two systems will enhance Sandy
City's ability to serve its own customers by eliminating a "hole"
in its delivery network.

Integration of the two systems also

will minimize the duplication of pipes and other facilities in
some areas, resulting in more reliable service to all of White
City's customers both inside and outside of Sandy City's limits.
Almost half of White City's customers reside within Sandy City
-20-

and

White

City's

non-resident
which

customers

is

within

are

Sandy

located
City's

in

an

unincorporated

island

existing

service area.

It is economically and operationally rational for

Sandy City to provide water service to those customers after its
acquisition of the system and incident to its overall resident
customer

water

delivery.

Furthermore,

Sandy

City

has

ample

capacity to serve the non-Sandy White City customers and will,
therefore, be selling "surplus" water to them upon acquisition of
the White City system.
C.

THE COMMISSION'S ORDER DOES NOT APPLY THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD TO DETERMINE IF SANDY CITY'S SALE
OP WATER TO NON-RESIDENT USERS IS A MUNICIPAL
FUNCTION.

The Commission attempts to rewrite Utah law by relying
on Utah Assoc. Mun. Power Sys. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 789 P.2d
298 (Utah 1990) ("UAMPS") and West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Bd. , 767 P. 2d 530 (Utah 1988) for its assertion that "service to the extra-territorial customers is not a municipal function."

Order

at

9.

The

Commissions

reliance

is misplaced

because the instant transaction does not fit within the UAMPS
analysis and the Commission did not properly apply the analysis.
The Commission cites West Jordan to assert that "no
particular activity conducted by a municipality is ipso facto a
municipal

function

Order at 10.

for

purposes

of

Article

VI,

Section 28."

The West Jordan case does not hold that there are

no activities which are necessarily municipal functions.
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Rather,

the case holds that where the character of a particular activity
under Utah law is not clear, the court will determine whether the
activity constitutes a municipal function by considering a number
of factors.

The Utah Supreme Court has, however, already deter-

mined that the sale of surplus water to non-residents is a proper
municipal function.

In County Water Sys., 278 P.2d at 285, the

court held that the "sale of surplus water, being authorized by
law as a municipal function, is as much a municipal function as
the supplying of water within the city limits."

Jd. at 290.

This ruling has never been questioned, much less overturned, by
the Utah Supreme Court; it is and remains controlling law in the
State of Utah

and the Commission may

not

ignore

its clear

holding.
Even, if the Commission is correct in its assumption
that the West Jordan case invalidates the County Water System
case as controlling law, the Commission would be required to make
detailed factual findings based upon evidence on a number of
issues, including:
the relative abilities of the state and
municipal governments to perform the function, the degree to which the performance of
the function affects the interest of those
beyond the boundaries of the municipality,
and the extent to which the legislation under
attack would intrude upon the ability of the
people within the municipality to control
through their elected officials are subject
to policy that affect them uniquely.
West Jordan, 767 P.2d at 534.
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The Commission has not made such specific findings nor
could it have made such findings because it refused to proceed
with an evidentiary basis.

In fact, the Commission's Findings of

Fact are very limited and do not address any of the conclusions
at which the Commission later arrived.
Fact are innocuous and

Rather, the Findings of

incomplete recitations of either the

Application or briefs.
The

Commission's

complete

Findings

of

Fact

are as

follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Applicant is a water corporation certificated by this
Commission.
In its Application, Applicant seeks
approval of a transfer of all its outstanding stock to
an instrumentality of Sandy City Corporation (hereafter
"Sandy"), a Utah municipal corporation. Applicant further seeks declaratory relief in the form of a Commission declaration that "the integrated system constitutes a municipal water system under the laws of the
State of Utah."

2.

Under the proposed contract terms, the stock would be
transferred to the Municipal Building Authority of
Sandy City (hereafter "the Authority").
Applicant
would retain its corporate existence for the lifetime
of the bonds issued by the Authority to finance the
purchase.

3.

Applicant would cease operating the system and, for a
nominal rental, would lease the system to the Authority, which in turn would sublease to Sandy.
Sandy
would actually operate the system and, to the extent
feasible, would integrate Applicant's present system
with Sandy's municipal system.
Payment to the bondholders would be made by the Authority out of rentals
realized from the sublease to Sandy, which in turn proposes to pay the rental fees out of water charges to
customers.

4.

In its brief, Sandy states explicitly that customers
residing outside the city limits will be charged more
than those residing within. The stated rationale is
-23-

that the customers outside the city limits should bear
a greater proportion of the costs of the acquisition.
5.

In the contract, the stock transfer is specifically
conditioned upon this Commission's final Order declaring that the Commission does not have and will not
assert any jurisdiction over Sandy, whether in regard
to customers residing inside or outside the city
limits.
From these limited findings, and without the benefit of

evidence, the Commission's Conclusions of Law "predict with considerable confidence, that in case of conflict between the interests of franchised and disenfranchised customers, the interests
of the former will receive priority —

no matter how vociferous

the protest raised in meetings." Order at 5.
This "prediction" is without support in the findings
and is without any evidence with respect to the process by which
Sandy City sets its rates.

Despite this lack of supporting evi-

dence, however, the Commission's Conclusions of Law continue by
stating:
Obviously, Sandy could issue and service its
own bonds. We strongly suspect the Authority
is involved in the transaction only in a
"belt and suspenders" attempt to insulate the
real principals, applicant and Sandy, from
our jurisdiction. We beli€»ve we are entitled
to assess the substance, not the mere form,
of a transaction. So assessing the transaction, it is obvious the Authority has no real
role or participation in the management, and
its presence should be disregarded.
Order at 7-8 (emphasis added). Based on suspicion, certainly not
the Findings of Fact nor any evidence, the Commission chooses to
disregard the structure of the transaction and the good faith of

-24-

the parties, stating that "in this case . . . Sandy will not be
disposing of surplus water it now possesses —

it will be surplus

only by virtue of Sandy's calculated acquisition of a class of
captive, disenfranchised

customers —

precisely the situation

Justice Crocket inveighed against." Order at 12-13.
Once again, the Findings of Fact contains no support
for this critical conclusion by the Commission.
to make such a finding, the Commission simply

Lacking evidence

makes an expedient

conclusion of law, ignoring the inherently factual nature of a
determination of "surplus."

This is a particularly important

jump for the Commission to make in its analysis because its later
conclusion that the transaction is not an appropriate exercise of
municipal power depends on its conclusion that the sale is not of
surplus water.

The Commission, through constructing this "neat"

syllogism, sought to avoid the full analysis of whether the
transaction was a constitutionally protected municipal function
under the West Jordan and UAMPS cases.
The Commission misapplies the ruling set out in UAMPS.
Both West Jordan and UAMPS determined that a statute granting
jurisdiction to a Commission is constitutional.

In contrast, in

this case the Commission is excluded by statute from regulating
Sandy City's water system.

In UAMPS a coalition of cities asked

the Commission for a certificate of convenience to construct
electric transmission lines in southern Utah.

The cities acted

under the auspices of the Interlocal Cooperation Act, Utah Code
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Ann. § 11-13-1 to -36 (1986) which requires such coalitions to
obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Commission before constructing a transmission line.
Ann. § 11-13-27 (1986).

See Utah Code

The Commission, after extensive evidence

was presented in over fifty hearings, denied the petition.

The

coalition sought to overturn the statute as unconstitutional on
the grounds it contravenes Article VI, Section 28 of the Utah
Constitution..
Although the Court in UAMPS rejected "pat characterizations" of specific functions or categories of functions as being
invariably

"municipal,"

it

did

not

question

long-standing holding of County Water Svs.

or

reject

the

Rather, the Court

analyzed whether under the factual scenario of UAMPS, the building of electric transmission lines over broad stretches of land
was

a

"municipal

function" excluding

Commission

where the state legislature had so provided.

jurisdiction

Unlike the coali-

tion of cities in UAMPS which was required by statute to seek
approval from the Commission for trcinsmission lines, the Commission is specifically excluded by statute from exercising jurisdiction over the sale of surplus water by municipalities.
Furthermore, even if the analytical framework set out
in UAMPS applies, the Commission failed to apply the balancing
approach to the facts in this case.

The Commissions analysis is

limited to the bold assertion, without any basis in fact, that
"the only 'substantial interest7 our assuming jurisdiction would
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affect would be that of Sandy in 'milking' the extra-territorial
customers to the maximum extent possible."

Order at 10, note 3.

The Commission does not refer to or put into the balance the following facts:

(1) Unlike the proposed transmission line in UAMPS

which had "far-reaching impacts beyond the boundaries of UAMPS
members," forty-two percent of White City customers are Sandy
City residents and the remaining White City customers are surrounded by Sandy City and form a "hole" in Sandy City's water
supply grid; and (2) Unlike the situation in UAMPS where the coalition proposed to duplicate existing and proposed lines, White
City needs extensive and costly updating to keep White City customers adequately provided with water for emergency situations
such as fires.

The Commission does not refer to the economies of

scale or increased public safety that will be effected by the
sale of White City Water to Sandy City and the integration of the
White City system into Sandy City's more reliable water system.
The* Commission utterly failed to apply any of the elements of the
balancing test to White City's petition and, indeed, could not
because it failed to undertake any factual investigation into the
matter.
D.

THE COMMISSION HAS ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED THAT SALE
OP WHITE CITY WATER TO NON-SANDY RESIDENTS WOULD
NOT BE "SURPLUS" WATER.

As noted

above, the Commission states, without any

findings of fact, that "in this case . . . Sandy will not be disposing of surplus water it now possesses —
-27-

it will be surplus

only by virtue of Sandy's acquisition of a class of captive, disenfranchised customers."

Order at 13.

The Commission gives no

criteria for how it determined that the White City water would
not be surplus water other than to cite to Judge Crockett's admonition that cities are not to engage in the sale of water outside
its limits as a general business.
at 290.

County Water Svs., 278 P.2d

The Commission fails to note Judge Crockett's recogni-

tion that such sale of surplus water is allowed by law and that
the Commission does not have jurisdiction to regulate it.

In

this regard, Judge Crockett stated:
Nevertheless, whatever the considerations as
to the wisdom of the city's being subject to
regulation by the Public Service Commission
may be, it is, perhaps fortunately, not our
responsibility to here evaluate these factors
and determine what is more desirable as a
matter of policy. It is rather our duty to
interpret what was intended by the framers of
the constitution and the legislative enactments thereunder.
Id. at 290.
Similarly,

the

Commission's

citation

of

C.P. Natl.

Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 638 P. 2d 519 (Utah 1981) reverses
the meaning of the case.

In C.P. National the court distin-

guished law that applied to the Commission's jurisdiction over
cities providing extra-territorial water systems and those providing extra-territorial electricity.

The Utah legislature has

specifically granted cities more power over water systems than
over electric power systems because water is a scarce and finite
resource that must be conserved.
-28-

In fact, the C.P. National

Court recognized this distinction by stating that "[tjhe reason
for the legislature giving broad powers to municipalities in the
case

of waterworks

systems may

have been because water

is a

scarce and finite resource which is not capable of man-made generation

or replacement

as electricity

may

be."

Id. at 523.

Because C.P. National dealt with the issue of the Commission's
jurisdiction over an electrical power system, the court distinguished its prior ruling in County Water System.

Consequently,

the holding in C.P. National strengthens Sandy City's position
that the sale of water to non-residents is not subject to the
Commission's regulations under the current laws of the State of
Utah.
II.

THE COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING CONSTITUTES A DENIAL
OF THE PARTIES/ RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS.

This Court has stated that "[e]very person who brings a
claim in a court or at a hearing held before an administrative
agency has a due process right to receive a fair trial in front
of a fair tribunal."
1331,

1333

Bunnell v. Industrial

(Utah 1987));

Comm'n, 740

P.2d

see also Tolman v. Salt Lake County

Attorney. 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (same).

In R.W.

Jones Trucking, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 649 P. 2d 628 (Utah
1982) , this

Court

made

it

clear

that

the

rule

announced

in

Bunnell and reiterated in Tolman applies to hearings before the
Public Service Commission by stating that "a party before the
Commission is entitled to 'the essential elements of due process
-29-

of law • . • notice, an opportunity to be heard and defend in an
orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case, before a
tribunal having jurisdiction of the case.'"

Id. at 629 (quoting

Fuller-Toponce Truck Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 99 Utah 28, 96
P. 2d 722 (1939)); see also Armored Motor Serv. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n. 23 Utah 2d 418, 464 P. 2d 582, 584 (Utah 1970) (holding
that a party appearing before the Commission "is entitled to . .
. a full and fair opportunity to present his [or her] evidence
and contentions on the issues; and to have an adequate consideration and a correct determination of them.").
Although administrative hearings need not possess the
formality of judicial proceedings, "there remains the 'necessity
of preserving fundamental requirements of procedural fairness in
administrative

hearings.'"

Id.

(quoting Nelson v. Dept. of

Employment, 801 P.2d 158, 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Indeed, as

noted by the Tolman Court "[i]t is a clear abuse of discretion
for an administrative body to exercise its discretion over the
manner in which it conducts its proceedings such that it denies
due process to a party appearing before it." Id.
When a decision by the Commission is judicial in nature
as it is here, more formality is required.

Id.

When resolving

such matters, the Commission must make findings of fact.

Moun-

tain States Legal Found, v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047,
1051 (Utah 1981).

In this regard, this Court recently stated

that the Commission must make sufficient findings of fact on
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ultimate and

subordinate

issues of fact, citing Milne Truck

Lines, Inc. v. Public Serv. Contain, 720 P.2d 1373, 1378 (Utah
1986) as authority.

MCI v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 186 Utah Adv.

Rep. 8, 13 (Utah 1992).

In Milne, this Court summarized the

responsibilities of the Commission and the rationale for imposing
these responsibilities by stating:
The Commission cannot discharge its statutory
responsibilities without making findings of
fact on all necessary ultimate issues under
the governing statutory standards.
It is
also essential that the Commission make subsidiary findings in sufficient detail that
the critical subordinate factual issues are
highlighted and resolved in such a fashion as
to demonstrate that there is a logical and
legal basis for the ultimate conclusions.
The importance of complete, accurate, and
consistent findings of fact is essential to a
proper determination by an administrative
agency. To that end, findings should be sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate factual conclusions, or
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are
reached.
Milne Truck Lines, Inc., 720 P. 2d at 1378.

The Court then

explained the importance of adequate findings of fact to an
appellate court by stating that "[w]ithout such findings, this
Court cannot perform its duty of reviewing the Commissioner's
order in accordance with established legal principles and of protecting the parties and the public from arbitrary and capricious
administrative action."

Id.

With these standards in mind, the

MCI Court reminded the Commission of its obligation to make sufficient findings of fact by stating that "the fixing of utility
rates by private negotiation with no findings of fact raises
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serious questions about the legality and integrity of the procedures the Commission employed."

MCI. 186 Utah Adv. Rep. at 13.

The Commission's Order th2it is the subject of this
action was issued without holding an evidentiary hearing despite
objections by Sandy City.

Indeed, before a hearing on the

approval of the agreement and the jurisdictional question was
held, the Commission had already drafted the Order at issue and
informed the parties that it would retain jurisdiction if the
agreement between White City and Sandy City were approved.

The

Commission told the parties they could argue before it to see if
the Commission would change its mind.

R. 0025.

White City

objected to deciding the issue of jurisdiction in a vacuum and
Sandy City argued that, under the terms most favorable to the
Commission's position, jurisdiction required a balancing test
based on a factual context.

Nonetheless, the Commission was ada-

mant that it would decide the jurisdictional

issue, standing

alone, before it heard any facts about whether the Agreement
between White City and Sandy City was in the public interest.
The Commission refused to consider facts about whether the public
interest would be served and by a simple fiat stated that the two
issues would be severed and that it would issue an Order declaring that it had jurisdiction.

No evidence was received by the

Commission prior to the entry of its Order.

In this regard, the

Commission deprived the parties of their right to due process by
refusing to provide the parties with a chance to present evidence
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relevant to their positions.

Indeed, an evidentiary hearing

would have allowed White City Water Company and Sandy City to
present facts to the Commission demonstrating that approval of
the proposed transaction would be in the public interest.

In

addition, an evidentiary hearing would give the Commission and
this Court the factual basis on which to determine the constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction if that determination is
governed, as the Commission contends, by the West Jordan case.
Consequently, the matter must be remanded to the Commission for an evidentiary hearing because "'due process demands
a new trial when the appearance of unfairness is so plain that
[the court] is left with the abiding impression that a reasonable
person would find the hearing unfair.'"

Tolman, 818 P.2d at 28.

In light of the fact that the Commission refused to hold any
hearing whatsoever, and gave no notice of its intent to bifurcate
the issues, a reasonable person would have no choice but to conclude the proceedings before the Commission were unfair.

The

unfairness of the proceeding below is most clearly illustrated by
comparing the Commission's "plain vanilla" Findings of Fact,
supra which merely recite portions of the application, with the
unsupported hyperbole in the Commission's Conclusions of Law.
Additionally, although the Commission's order purports
to make findings of fact on issues material to this case, there
is no evidence in the record to support these findings.

In fact,

the Commission expressly states that its decision is based upon
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its "doubts that service outside the city boundaries would constitute exercise of a municipal function and [their] skepticism
that Sandy would indeed be selling surplus water as contemplated
by the Utah statutes."

Order at 4 (emphasis added).

As noted by

the Kansas Supreme Court, "[f]indings not based on evidence, but
on suspicion and conjecture are arbitrary and baseless."

Cities

Servs. Gas. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n., 440 P. 2d 660, 668 (Kan.
1968).

An order based on arbitrary and baseless findings cannot

be sustained

because, as noted by this Court, "to sustain an

order, the findings must be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate
that the Commission has properly arrived at the ultimate factual
findings and has properly applied the governing rules of law to
those findings."

Mountain States Legal Found., 63 6 P.2d at 1052.

Accordingly, the Commissions order at issue in this case cannot
be sustained by this Court.
III. THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS NOT PINAL.
A.

THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS NOT FINAL BECAUSE
THE REQUIREMENTS OP RULE 54(b) OF THE UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE HAVE NOT BEEN
SATISFIED.

In its order severing the proceedings, notwithstanding
the fact it has never held a hearing concerning whether approving
White City's application is in the public interest, the Commission issued what it has called a "final order" on the issue of
jurisdiction.

Before

an

order
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can

be

final

for

appellate

purposes, however, the requirements of Rule 54(b) of the Utah
2
Rules of Civil Procedure must be satisfied.
This rule states:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, and/or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer
than all of the claims or parties only upon
an express determination by the court that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment.
In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates
fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties
shall not terminate the action as to any of
the claims or parties, and the order or other
form of decision is subject to revision at
any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).
In l i g h t of t h e express language of Rule 54(b), c o u r t s
have held t h a t an a p p e l l a t e court lacks j u r i s d i c t i o n when i s s u e s
and/or p a r t i e s remain before t h e t r i a l
F i r s t Sec.

court.

For example,

in

Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), t h e

Utah Court of Appeals held t h a t i t did not have j u r i s d i c t i o n over
one claim t h a t had been t r i e d s e p a r a t e l y because other

related

claims remained below.

1

Rule 750-100-11 of t h e Utah A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Code s t a t e s t h a t " [ a ] p p e a l s
from f i n a l o r d e r s of t h e Commission s h a l l be t o t h e Supreme Court of Utah and
s h a l l be pursued i n accordance with t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e s and c o u r t r u l e s . "
Utah Admin. R. 750-100-11 (1992).
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Even if the forum issuing an order certifies the order
as final for appeal, the analysis does not end.

Indeed, this

Court

other

has

stated

"cannot. . .

that

a

district

court

or

make a non-final order appealable.

either final or it is not.

forum

An order is

The terminology used in describing it

cannot change its fundamental character."

Olsen v. Salt Lake

City Sch. Dist., 724 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1986).

In this regard,

this Court has stated that Rule 54(b) certifications are rather
freely

granted,

"often

without

examining

certifiability of the underlying order."

closely

the

Kennecott Corp. v. Utah

State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Utah 1991).

The Court

continued by offering the following standard to determine if an
issue should be certified under Rule 54(b):

"When [the] factual

overlap [of issues] is such that separate claims appear to be
based on the same operative facts with minor variations, they are
held not to constitute separate claims for Rule 54(b) purposes."
Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1103.

In other words, "a 'separate claim7

must arise from different facts than those underlying the remaining causes of action."

Webb v. Vantage Income Properties, 818

P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1991).

Similarly, this court has also stated

that
"Finality," for purposes of the application
of Rule 54(b), is generally understood as
that degree of finality required to meet the
appealability requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. . . . This, in turn, is usually
defined as a judgment "which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment."
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Olsen, 724 P.2d at 964-65 (citations omitted).

In sum, disposing

of one significant issue in a case does not make certification
appropriate.

Webb, 818 P.2d at 2.

In light of the standards of Rule 54(b) discussed
above, the Commission's characterization of its order as final is
improper.

Indeed, as demonstrated by the language from Kennecott

quoted above, the Commission could not properly have certified
this order as final because the operative facts underlying this
order not only overlap but are identical to those involved in the
contract issue pending before the Commission.

The only way the

Commission could resolve its "doubts" and "conjecture" would be
to complete its review of the public interest issues still pending.

Additionally, the Commission's order regarding jurisdiction

did not end litigation on the merits of White City's action as
required by Olsen.
to hear

this

Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction

appeal

and, therefore, the

Commission's

order

regarding the appeal should be dismissed and the matter remanded
to the Commission for resolution of all the pending issues.
Manila v. Broadbent Land Co. , 818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991) (holding
that the remedy for improperly accepting an appeal is dismissal
of the appeal).
B.

THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS NOT A FINAL ORDER
BECAUSE RELEVANT ISSUES STILL REMAIN UNRESOLVED.

This action began when White City Water Company filed
an Application with the Commission to approve a contract that
White City had entered into with Sandy City and the Building
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Authority.

The Commission did not determine whether it would

approve the contract and that issue is still pending.

In fact,

the Commission is in the process of scheduling hearings to determine whether the transaction should be approved.

Without making

a determination about the public int€>rest, and without gathering
any evidence, the Commission issued an order stating that it
would retain jurisdiction over White City water users residing
outside of Sandy if the transaction was completed.

In support of

its decision, the Commission stated:
We deem the jurisdictional question of such
importance that it should be resolved before
inquiring whether the transfer is in the public interest.
Accordingly, we sever the
prayer for declaratory relief from the balance of the proceeding and declare the Commission has jurisdiction over a municipality
to the extent it provides retail water service outside its boundaries as a general
business.
Commission's Order Severing Proceeding at 1.
This Court has appellate jurisdiction to review final
orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings
before the Commission.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (e) (i)

1992) ("The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over . . . final orders
and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with
the

Public

Service

Commission.");

Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 63-46b-16 (1992) ("As provided by statute, the Supreme Court
. . . has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.").
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As noted by the

express

language of the statutes quoted

above, this Court's

jurisdiction is limited to the review of final orders of the Commission.

Additionally, applicable case law holds that courts do

not have jurisdiction to review an administrative decision until
all issues have been resolved and the proceeding before the
administrative agency is final.

See Keystone, a Division of

Ralston Purina Co. v. Flynn, 769 P.2d 484, 489 (Colo. 1989).

The

following discussion demonstrates that the order at issue in this
case is not a final order.

Consequently, this Court does not

have jurisdiction to hear this matter.
Where an applicant raises issues to be decided, an
order of the Commission is not final until those issues are
resolved.

JEd.

Thus, "an order of [an] agency is not final so

long as it reserves something for the agency for further decision. "

Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463, 464 (Utah Ct.

App. 1989) (per curiam) (holding that an order remanding the case
to Administrative Law Judge for further proceedings was not a
final order for purposes of judicial review).

Simply assigning a

separate docketing number to one phase of a proceeding does not
make an interlocutory decision final.

Public Util. Comm/n v.

Paudre Valley Rural Elec. Ass'n, 173 Colo. 364, 366, 480 P.2d
106, 108 (Colo. 1970).

Applying this rule to a case involving

the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that "[t]he assignment of separate numbers by the Commission to its decisions dealing with different phases of the
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same proceeding did not create two separate proceedings."

Id.

The court continued by stating that reducing an administrative
matter

to

final

judgment

required

"settling

all

the

issues

between the parties." Id.
The principles discussed by the Colorado Supreme Court
in Paudre Valley are directly applicable in this case.

Accord-

ingly, the Commission may not create a separate proceeding simply
by purporting to carve out one issue in a proceeding and assigning it a separate docket number.

Additionally, even assuming

that the Commission could create a separate proceeding, it has
not done so.

Although the Commission stated that the proceeding

had been bifurcated, no actual separation was, or could have been
done.

Had the proceeding been bifurcated, thereby creating two

separate and distinct cases, two separate and distinct case files
would have been created, each containing only the documents relevant to its respective case.

Instead, the Commission has main-

tained only one file containing all documents relevant to both
supposed separate and distinct cases.

Indeed, the record on

review as designated by the Commission is not limited to those
documents relevant to the issue of jurisdiction.

Rather, the

record sent up to this Court contains all documents in the file
relating to White City's initial application.

In fact, the file

before the Commission in regards to its continued consideration
of White City's application is identical to the file considered
by the Commission before it ruled on the issue of jurisdiction.
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In sum, the Commission cannot and has not created two separate
matters in this case.

The initial issue of White City's applica-

tion, therefore, remains before the Commission.

In fact, the

Commission implicitly admits that its order regarding jurisdiction does not resolve all the issues before it by stating in the
order that "[i]n light of our action in this proceeding, Applicant may choose to proceed or not in the approval action."
Order at 4.

Clearly until the issue of approval is resolved, the

Commissions order regarding jurisdiction is not a final order.
CONCLUSION
This case is prematurely before the Utah Supreme Court.
In fact, this matter is before this Court only because White City
and Sandy City were required to appeal the Commission's Order
regarding jurisdiction because the Commission purported to parse
out a jurisdictional question through the simple expedient of
assigning a new case number and then characterized that decision
as final.

That approach was unfair to the parties, to the Com-

mission itself and ultimately to this Court.
The central question pending before the Commission is
whether the subject transaction is in the public interest.

The

evidence relating to that determination is the same evidence
which, under the Commission's reading of the UAMPS and West Jordan cases, is necessary for the Commission to constitutionally
assert jurisdiction.

Even that analysis, however, will not

resolve the absence of statutory authorization for the Commission
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to

assert

jurisdiction

extra-territorial

over

the

provision

customers of Sandy City.

of

water

to

Furthermore, the

jurisdictional stretch attempted by the Commission may not be
necessary because the Commission ultimately may decide that the
sale is not in the public interest, that the sale will not be in
the public interest if the Commission does not have jurisdiction
on an ongoing basis, or that the sale will not be in the public
interest if conditions that are a reasonable substitute for the
exercise of jurisdiction cannot be imposed subsequent to the
sale.

Again, the Commissions rush to judgment has deprived

itself, and ultimately this Court, of the record against which
that determination can be judged.
The manner in which the Commission conducted the proceedings below is equally troublesome.

Although the Commission

purported to make findings of fact, those findings of fact have
nothing to do with the ultimate conclusions.

Indeed, the Commis-

sion's Conclusions of Law are largely factual recitations couched
in terms of surmise or speculation.

This Court, and other courts

reviewing administrative decisions, have consistently and repeatedly underscored the importance of due process to those appearing
before an cidministrative body.

The quintessential violation of

due process in an administrative context occurs when, as in this
case, findings of fact are made without any supporting evidence
even being presented let alone considered and subsequently, conclusions of law are reached that have no relationship to the
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unsupported findings.
mate

conclusions

This is particularly true when the ulti-

characterize

the

parties

before

it

in

perjorative terms without any evidence to support these characterizations.

Quite simply, this matter must be remanded to the

Commission for further proceedings consistent with the constitutional mandate for due process and basic fairness.
DATED this 15th day of December, 1992.
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In the Matter of the Application
of WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY for
Commission Approval of a Contract
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October, 1991, Under Which Contract
Sandy City and the Municipal Building Authority of Sandy City, Utah,
Will Purchase All of the Outstanding Stock of WHITE CITY WATER
COMPANY.

—

DOCKET NO. 91 -018-02
ORDER SEVERING PROCEEDING
AND
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February 20, 1992

SYNOPSIS
Applicant, a certificated water corporation, seeks approval of
the sale of all its stock to a local governmental entity and the
assumption of service to its present customers by a municipal
corporation. Applicant further asks the Commission to declare it has
no jurisdiction over the municipality's subsequent water service
operations insofar as they relate to Applicant's customers residing
outside the municipal boundaries.
We deem the jurisdictional
question of such importance that it should be resolved before
inquiring whether the transfer is in the public interest.
Accordingly, we sever the prayer for declaratory relief from the
balance of the proceeding and declare the Commission has jurisdiction
over a municipality to the extent it provides retail water service
outside its boundaries as a general business.
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y the Commission:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The application in this matter was filed November 4, 1991. The
:ommission conducted a prehearing conference December 9, 1991, and
isked

the

parties

to

brief

the

issues

of

the

Commission's

jurisdiction to approve the contract which is the subject of these
proceedings and, should the contract be approved, the Commission's
jurisdiction
residing

over Sandy City

outside

the

city.

in connection with water
Oral

Commission on February 18, 1992.

arguments

were

customers

heard

by

the

Having been fully advised in the

premises, the Commission enters the following Report and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Applicant
Commission.

is

a

water

corporation

certificated

by

this

In its Application, Applicant seeks approval of a

transfer of all its outstanding stock to an instrumentality of
Sandy City Corporation, (hereafter "Sandy") a Utah municipal
corporation. Applicant further seeks declaratory relief in the
form of a Commission declaration that "the integrated system
constitutes a municipal water system under the laws of the
State of Utah."
2.

Under

the

proposed

contract

terms,

the

stock

would

be

transferred to the Municipal Building Authority of Sandy City
(hereafter

"the

Authority").

Applicant

would

retain

its

corporate existence for the lifetime of the bonds issued by the
Authority to finance the purchase.
3.

Applicant would cease operating the system and, for a nominal
rental, would lease the system to the Authority, which in turn

DOCKET NO. 91-018-02
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would sublease to Sandy.

Sandy would actually operate the

system and, to the extent feasible, would integrate Applicant's
present system with Sandy's municipal system-

Payment to the

bondholders would be made by the Authority out of rentals
realized from the sublease to Sandy, which in turn proposes to
pay the rental fees out of water charges to customers.
4.

In its brief, Sandy states explicitly that customers residing
outside

the

city

residing within.

limits

will

be

charged

more

than

those

The stated rationale is that the customers

outside the city limits should bear a greater proportion of the
costs of the acquisition.
5.

In the contract, the stock transfer is specifically conditioned
upon

this

Commission's

final

Order

declaring

that

the

Commission does not have and will not assert any jurisdiction
over Sandy, whether in regard to customers residing inside or
outside the city limits.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As we view it, Applicant seeks two separate and distinct forms
of relief—approval, per se, of the contract, and declaratory relief
in regard to the Commission's jurisdiction.

We deem the declaratory

branch of the proceeding so important that it should be severed from
the approval branch.
The subject transaction differs from other transfers hitherto
considered, by the Commission in that the transfer is to an entity
arguably outside Commission jurisdiction.

It would leave a number of

customers, who have had recourse to the Commission for grievances,
effectively without recourse to any entity, public or private. Given

DOCKET NO, 91-018-02
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lat stark fact, we refuse to take the

"all or nothing" choice

resented

propose

by

Applicant,

Instead,

we

to

resolve

the

arisdictional issue in this proceeding, with the docket number in
he caption above, as a matter separate from the contract approval*
n light of our action in this proceeding, Applicant may choose to
roceed or not in the approval action.
We turn now to the merits of the jurisdictional issue.
We concede at the outset that we have no authority to regulate
L municipality within its boundaries. However, we conclude that case
.aw, statutory

law, and public policy

support

our authority

to

regulate Sandy f s water service outside its boundaries. In reaching
:his

conclusion,

aisenfranchisement
limited

statutory

we

believe

of

the

the

salient

considerations

extra-territorial

powers, the structure

customers,

include
Sandy's

of the transaction, our

doubts that service outside the city boundaries would constitute
exercise of a municipal function, and our skepticism that Sandy would
indeed be selling surplus water as contemplated by the Utah statutes.
Dis€?nfranchisement of the Customers
At present, all of Applicant's customers, inside and outside
the city limits, have recourse to the Commission to ensure just and
reasonable

rates.

Absent our

involvement

in Sandy's

ratemaking

outside its boundaries, the customers would have no means to prevent
Sandy from charging excessive rates.

In its initial brief, Sandy

states that the customers are not "entirely" disenfranchised, since
they can attend Sandy City public meetings. (Sandy, Initial Brief, at
9).
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We deem the assertion less than ingenuous.

One cannot be

partially disenfranchised; either one can vote or not.

Clearly the

customers located outside Sandy's boundaries do not have a right to
vote in Sandy City.

The opportunity to attend meetings is a poor

substitute for the right to reward or punish via the ballot.
The fact that Sandy proposes to charge a differential rate
immediately upon approval of the transaction is a strong indication
of

how

the

"outside" customers

would

fare under

the proposal.

Indeed, we can predict with considerable confidence, that in case of
conflict between the interests of franchised and disenfranchised
customers, the interests of the former will receive priority—no
matter how vociferous the protests raised in meetings.
Limitation of Sandy's Statutory Powers
Unquestionably, as Sandy asserts, the Commission is a creature
of statute with all the limitations on power and jurisdiction that
implies.

However, Sandy itself stands in much the same position; its

powers are circumscribed also. See State v. Hutchinson, 624 P. 2d
1116, 1121 (Utah 1980).1
We proceed first on the premise that if Sandy takes over the
utility service of White City Water Company, the city must also take
on the utility's obligations.

According to our Supreme Court in

North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Co, 223 P. 2d 577

1

The yHutchinson Court actually broadened a municipality's
authority by holding that the powers delegated by the Legislature
should be liberally construed. The Court's rationale was that local
democratic institutions should be strengthened, thus empowering
citizens in regard to the local affairs most immediately affecting
them.
Were we to adopt the Applicant's position, we would, of
course, actually disempower the extra-territorial customers, running
counter to the Hutchinson rationale.
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Utah 1950), when North Salt Lake condemned a water company, it took
pon itself the obligations imposed upon the water company, including
he

effect

of

an

Order

issued

by

this

Commission

before

the

:ondemnat ion.2
Other jurisdictions have extended the principle explicitly to
Include rate regulation.

For example, in City of Orangeburg v. Moss,

204 S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 1974), the court held that the South Carolina
PSC had jurisdiction to regulate a municipality operating electrical
facilities

outside

its

boundaries.

The

court

held

that

the

constitutional grant of Power to municipalities by the State to
operate electrical facilities was not a limitation on the power of
the State to regulate those activities through the PSC or otherwise.
It is the position of the plaintiff in the current action
that
this
constitutional
grant
of power
to the
municipalities of the State to operate electrical
facilities is a limitation on the power of the State of
South Carolina to regulate those activities through the
Public Service Commission or otherwise. The writer does
not agree. He feels that the section in question was no
more than a constitutional provision to permit certain
municipal activities previously held ultra vires and that

2

At the time of that hearing the water company was a
utility subject to the rules and regulations of the
Public Service Commission and its findings and orders
were binding on the company, its successors, those
claiming through or under it, and those later dealing
with it.
* * *

If limitations were imposed on the water company in the
hearing before the Public Service Commission, then
condemnation of the property by the town would not unblock
the * controls.
The . . . town takes the franchise and
property subject to all burdens of furnishing water that
were imposed at the time of transfer.
Id. at 223 P.2d 577. If a previous Commission Order is binding on a
town clearly exercising a municipal function, a fortiori the town is
subject to Commission regulation when exercising a non-municipal
function.
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it is not to be construed as limiting the powers of the
State to regulate such activities, (emphasis added.)
Id. at 378.
specifically
service.

It is true that South Carolina had in place legislation
empowering

their

PSC

to

regulate

extra-territorial

The issue, nevertheless, was the constitutionality of that

legislation, and we believe there is scant difference in principle
between that case and this.
It is not unreasonable to suppose that one of the obligations
Sandy may be required to assume is that of state regulation of rates
charged to customers residing outside the city limits.
As derogating from the foregoing analysis, we have been cited
Article XI, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution which provides a
municipality the authority to furnish public utility services "local
in extent and use"; Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-914 (3) ; the Municipal
Building Authority Act; the 1988 amended definition of "person" under
Utah Code Ann. § 4-2-2; and Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 which gives a
municipality

authority

to condemn

a water

system.

We do not

perceive any of these provisions as denying us authority to regulate
rates charged by Sandy for water service outside its boundaries.
Article XI, Section 5, gives Sandy the power to furnish public
utility

services, but

not

necessarily

the power

to

set

extra-

territorial rates, particularly in light of the "local in extent and
use"

provision,

which

has

no

obvious

meaning

other

than

as a

reference to the City's boundaries.
Any prohibition by the Municipal
irrelevant in this proceeding.
above,

the

sole

role

of

the

Building Authority Act is

As noted in the Findings of Fact
Authority

is

to

be

Obviously, Sandy could issue and service its own bonds.

a

conduit.
We strongly
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uspect the Authority is involved in the transaction only in a "belt
nd suspenders" attempt to insulate the real principals, Applicant
nd Sandy, from our jurisdiction.

We believe we are entitled to

ssess the substance, not the mere form, of the transaction.

So

issessing the transaction, it is obvious the Authority has no real
role or participation in the arrangement, and its presence should be
lisregarded.
It is true that in 1988 the Legislature deleted "governmental
entity" from the definition of "person."
(1988).

Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-2

Our perusal of the Legislative history of this change,

however, does not indicate that the Legislature intended to foreclose
our regulation of a city's extra-territorial retail water customers.
(See

transcript

of the

Legislative

history

on

this amendment,

Exhibit "A" to Reply Brief, White City Water Users).
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 does give a municipality power
to

condemn

a water

system, but

it does not necessarily give a

municipality power to set utility rates for extra-territorial
customers.

retail

In a condemnation proceeding, a city is limited by strict

laws to protect the new owners of those systems and the citizens
served thereby.

Indeed, as noted earlier, the St. Joseph Water case,

supra, suggests that water systems acquired by condemnation carry
with them all their regulatory baggage.
Sandy does not have specific delegated authority to serve water
outside its boundaries without state regulation.

Where there are

gaps in the coverage of applicable statutes, as in the instant case,
we believe that legislative intent should be interpreted so as to
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protect constitutional rights of citizens, which in this case are the
extra-territorial retail customers.
The Nature of the Arrangement
As noted above, Sandy has made great efforts to avoid our
jurisdiction in the way it has set up the proposed transfer.

The

elaborate

the

nature

of

the

arrangement

between

White

City,

Authority, and Sandy, renders the arrangement suspect.
Sandy's

initial brief claims that neither White City, the

Authority, nor Sandy are subject to our regulation.
Brief, at 6-14) .

(Sandy, Initial

As noted above, the role of the Authority is

explicable only as an attempt to avoid our jurisdiction.

Given the

expressed intent to charge extra-territorial customers differential
rates, Sandy's good faith, in structuring the transaction as it has,
must be questioned.
Sandy is Not Performing a Municipal Function
Should Sandy provide water service to White City's extraterritorial customers, it would, to that extent, not be exercising a
municipal function.

Sandy would be acting as a traditional utility

(exercising a business function) and therefore would be subject to
regulation.
Sandy
prohibits

us

claims
from

that Utah
interfering

(Sandy, Initial Brief, at 7 ) .

Constitution
with

Art. VI, Section 28,

Sandy's municipal

functions.

Obviously, we agree that we cannot

interfere s,with Sandy's municipal functions, but we maintain that
Sandy's proposed service to the extra-territorial customers is not a
municipal function.

DOCKET NO. 91-018-02
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Recent Utah cases support our position.

In Utah Associated

lunicipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, 789 P. 2d 298
[Utah 1990), in which Art. VI, Section 28, was at issue, the Court
liscussed

the

Associated

alleged

Municipal

"municipal

Power

Systems

function"
("UAMPS")

performed
in

by

attempting

construct a utility line and to provide utility service.
resisted

the

jurisdiction

of

the

Commission

on

Utah
to

UAMPS

constitutional

grounds, arguing that they were political subdivisions exercising
municipal

functions, even though part of their service area was

located outside, or would have a substantial impact outside, the
boundaries of the political subdivisions.
The UAMPS Court applied a balancing test first enunciated in
City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Board, 767 P.2d, 530
(Utah 1988).

Under that test, no particular activity conducted by a

municipality is ipso facto a municipal function for purposes of Art.
VI, Section 28.

Instead, a functional analysis is to be conducted,

considering such factors as
the relative abilities of the state and municipal
governments to perform the function, the degree to which
the performance of the function affects the interests of
those beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and the
extent to which the legislation under attack will intrude
upon the ability of the people within the municipality to
control through their elected officials the substantive
policies that affect them uniquely.3

3

Id. kat 534. The Court went on to say the balancing test would
best serve the Constitutional purpose without "erecting mechanical
conceptual categories that, without serving any substantial interest,
may hobble the effective government which the state constitution as
a whole was designed to permit."
Ibid.
In the instant case, of
course, the only "substantial interest" our assuming jurisdiction
would affect would %be that of Sandy in "milking" the extraterritorial customers to the maximum extent possible.
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Applying that test, the UAMPS Court had little difficulty in finding
that the construction

of the utility

transmission

line

for the

purpose of generating, buying and selling electricity across the
state was outside the ambit of Art. VI, Section 28. Utah Associated
Municipal Power Systems v. Public Service Commission, supra, 789 P.
2d at 302.
The present proposal is closely analogous to the UAMPS case.
In particular, those residing outside Sandy stand to be severely
impacted, while our assuming jurisdiction in regard to them would
have minimal impact on Sandy's legitimate interests. By purposefully
acquiring an existing public utility, and thereby taking over the
obligation to serve 58% of the customers of an existing certificated
public

utility,

Sandy

is

stepping

outside

the

exercise

of

its

municipal function and subjecting itself to state regulation of rates
for those extra-territorial customers surplus.
Sandy attempts to bolster its position by referring to Utah
Code

Ann.

§

10-8-14(1)

municipality.
against

concerning

sale

of

surplus

water

by

a

A careful reading of this statute, however, weighs

Sandy's

proposal

and

in

favor

of

the

extra-territorial

customers.
According to the statute, a city "may sell and deliver the
surplus product or service capacity of any such works, not required
by the city or its inhabitants, to others beyond the limits of the
city.

. .s . "

in attempting

to show

that

it would

be serving

"surplus" water in accordance with this statute, Sandy states that it
"has more than ample capacity to serve the non-Sandy White City
customers and will therefore in fact be selling 'surplus1 water to
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hem upon acquisition of the White City system."
irief, at 8 ) .

(Sandy, Initial

This interpretation is contrary to Utah case law on

:he subject and contrary to a common sense definition of "surplus."
In support of Sandy's interpretation

of surplus, it cites

:ountv Water System v. Salt Lake City, 278 P 2d 285 (Utah 1954) and
Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P 2d 119 (Utah 1977)
In County Water System, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated
that the authority of municipalities to sell utility services beyond
its corporate boundaries was limited
water.

to the disposal of surplus

Id. at 289.
In fact, after first delineating a municipality's powers of

surplus water disposal in sweeping terms, Justice Crockett, writing
for the Court, appears to have had immedicite second thoughts.

In his

next paragraph, he hedged the municipality's authority:
But such permissive sale of surplus water . . . is clearly
not calculated to permit the city to purchase water solely
for resale, nor to construct, own or manage facilities and
equipment for the distribution of water outside of its
city limits as a general business.
Id. at 290.
The Court also made clear

its concept of surplus

water—a

temporary glut occasioned by provision for prudent future expansion.
This would,

according

to the

court,

foreclose

a

municipality's

commitment to purchasers of surplus water for any long-term supply.
Ibid.

Under this concept, if Sandy is indeed to sell surplus water,

the extra-territorial customers stand to be left literally high and
dry in the near to medium term.
In this case, however, Sandy will not be disposing of surplus
water it now possesses—it will be surplus only by virtue of Sandy's
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calculated

acquisition

customers—precisely

of

the

a

class

of

situation

captive,

Justice

disenfranchised

Crockett

inveighed

against.
Sandy cites Salt Lake County, supra, for the proposition that
11

[A municipality's] business in furnishing water to its residents and

activities

reasonably

incidental

thereto

regulation by the Public Service Commission."
122.

is

not

subject

to

Id. at 570 P.2d 121-

Sandy, however, fails to quote the complete paragraph. The

next, and more relevant sentence is: "But just however great an
extent a city may engage in rendering a utility service outside its
city limits without being subject to some public regulation is not so
clearly determined." (emphasis added.)
mere dictum.

The second sentence is not

The case involved the propriety of a summary judgment

rendered by the district court, and the Supreme Court remanded for
determination of precisely the issue of a municipality's amenability
to regulation of extra-territorial

service.

We do not know the

subsequent course of the litigation.
The Salt Lake County case evidences to us the Court's concern
with precisely the potential
proposal.

for abuse presented by the instant

We think it would be difficult to find a clearer instance

of a city's stepping over the boundary of legitimate surplus water
sales under the statute.
Our conclusion is strengthened by C.P. National Corporation v.
Public Service Commission, 638 P. 2d 519 (Utah 1981),

According to

the Court,
" . . . We believe that [Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-14] imposes
a limitation on a city operating outside its borders. It
negates the proposition that a city could purposely engage
in the distribution of power to localities or persons
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outside its limits except to dispose of surplus." [Citing
County Water System, supra].
In the instant case, the
municipalities intend to continue to serve a large area
outside any of their limits. . . .
Section 10-8-14 does not contemplate nor authorize a city
to so operate its electric light and power works. There
is
good
justification
for
this
limitation
since
municipally owned utilities are not subject to the
jurisdiction and supervision of the Public Service
Commission
but
are
controlled
solely
by
the
administration of the city or town wherein they are
located . . . customers who are non-residents of the
municipalities would be left at the mercy of officials
over whom they have no control at the ballot box and they
could not turn to the Public Service
Commission for
relief. (emphasis added.) (citations omitted.)
Id. at 524.
We can only add that the situation is not one whit different
when a municipality purposefully acquires an existing, regulated
water system.

While there may be no explicit statutory authority for

us to assume jurisdiction, the obvious remedy for the abuse of extraterritorial customers is for us to continue to regulate their rates;
otherwise, to meet the Court's concern, the instant proposal would
have to be found ultra vires.4
If there is a common thread running through the history of
economic regulation in the United States, it is the abhorrence of
unchecked monopoly.

We see no reason to suppose that a monopoly held

by a municipality over powerless extra-territorial utility customers
would be any more benevolent than a monopoly held privately.

Sandy's

expressed intent to impose higher rates immediately upon the extraA

That is the course the Court took in the CP National case. The
main issue was the constitutionality of the municipalities' acquiring
an existing electrical utility by condemnation. The Court assumed
without discussion that we would have no jurisdiction over rates
charged the extra-territorial customers.
One wonders if the same
result would have been reached had the Court considered the
jurisdictional issue and applied the City of West Jordan test.
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territorial customers is ample demonstration of the reason we are
unwilling to cede jurisdiction in these circumstances•
We

conclude

that

in the

event

the

proposal

presented

by

Applicant were to be approved by the Commission, the Commission would
retain jurisdiction to regulate rates charged the extra-territorial
retail customers, at least to the extent of nullifying invidious
discrimination.

Accordingly, Applicants prayer for a declaratory

judgment to the contrary should be denied.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
»

On the Commission's own motion, the prayer of WHITE CITY WATER
COMPANY, for a declaration that, should the Commission approve
a transfer of the stock of said company to the Sandy City
Building Board, pursuant to the contract delineated in said
Company's

application,

the

Commission

would

have

no

jurisdiction thereafter to set rates for customers residing
outside the boundaries of Sandy City, be, and the same hereby
is, severed from the balance of the proceeding and given the
Docket Number 91-018-02;
>>

Said prayer is denied;

>>

Any party aggrieved by this Order may, within 30 days of the
issuance hereof, petition for review; failure so to do will
forfeit the right to such review, as well as the right to
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20th day of February,
.992.
/s/ Brian T. Stewart, Chairman

(SEAL)

/ s / James M. Byrne, Commissioner

/s/ Stephen C. Hewlett, Commissioner
Pro Tempore
ATTEST:

/ s / Julie Orchard
Commission Secretary

Tab 2

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY FOR
COMMISSION APPROVAL OF A CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO ON THE 8TH DAY OF
OCTOBER, 1991/ UNDER WHICH
CONTRACT SANDY CITY AND THE
MUNICIPAL BUILDING AUTHORITY OF
SANDY CITY/ UTAH, WILL PURCHASE
ALL OF THE OUTSTANDING STOCK OF
WHITE CITY WATER COMPANY

APPLICATION
Docket No . ty-OIS-O]

White City Water Company hereby petitions and
represents to the Commission as follows:
1.

White City Wat^r Company is a corporation

organized under and pursuant to the laws of the State of
Utah and having its principal place of business in Salt Lake
County/ State of Utah.
2.

Sandy City is a municipal corporation organized

and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State
of Utah and is located within the boundaries of Salt Lake
County, Utah.
3.

The Municipal Building Authority of Sandy

City, Utah/ is established and created pursuant to Title 17A,
Chapter 3, Part 9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
4.

On the 8th day of October, 1991, Sandy City

and the Muncipal Building Authority of Sandy City entered

into a contract with White City Water Company whereby Sandy
City, through its municipal building authority, will acquire
the stock of White City Water Company, pursuant to certain
terms and conditions set forth in the contract, a copy of
which contract is marked Exhibit A and attached hereto.
5.

White City Water Company holds Certificate

of Convenience and Necessity No. 1121 issued by the Public
Service Commission of Utah on the 11th day of May, 1955,
authorizing the Company to:

(a)

Construct, maintain and operate a water system
consisting of a water well located in Section 8,
Township 3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian
in Salt Lake County, Utah having a capacity of
approximately 1,200 gallons of water per minute
with a pipe line leading from said well to a 500,000
gallon reservoir located in Section 9, Township 3
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian
with a pipe line leading from said storage tank
to the area to be served with the necessary distribution
lines, service lines and other facilities to serve
water for domestic, culinary and other purposes
within the area bounded on the West by the East
line of 7th East Street, on the East by 20th East
Street, on the North by 94th South Street and
on the South by 120th South Street in Salt Lake
County, Utah.

(b)

To construct, maintain and operate such additional
wells, pipe lines and extended water system facilities
as may be necessary from time to time to adequately
serve water for domestic, culinary and other purposes
within the area above specified.
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6.

The above described geographical area is

contiguous and lies partly within Sandy City and partly
within the unincorporated area of Salt Lake County.

White

City Water Company has approximately 3650 customers plus
83 lines to residential lots, not yet connected.

42% of

the connections are within the city limits of Sandy City
and 58% are in contiguous Salt Lake County.
7.

Sandy City has constructed and maintained

a municipal culinary water system rendering service to approximately 21/050 residential/ commercial/ and industrial customers
within the limits of Sandy City.

The Sandy City water system

is an efficient and well-maintained system having facilities
to deliver water to its customers.

The water system at present

has facilities which are fully sufficient to provide storage
and pressure to its existing customers as well as to the customers
of White City Water Company if this contract is approved.
8.

White City Water Company has a distributing

system sufficient to serve its current customers.

White

City Water Company also has water rights which during
ordinary years are fully sufficient to give adequate and
continuous water service to its customers.

However, White

City Water Company lacks adequate facilities for the
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storage of water at a sufficient elevation to provide sufficient
pressure to adequately serve its customers and, in case
of an emergency draw down, a lack of sufficient storage
capacity to meet a prolonged emergency.

In order to adjust

for this situation. White City Water Company has arrangements
whereby it will sell certain water at its wellheads to the
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and purchase
back at a very much higher price from the Salt Lake County
Water Conservancy District water delivered at a sufficient
elevation and in sufficient quantities to provide both pressure
and adequate flow in emergency situations.

This arrangement

is an expensive one for White City Water Company as it receives
for its water at the wellhead under this contract $20.00
per acre foot while it pays for the water delivered at the
higher elevations the sum of $125.22 per acre foot.

This

contract with the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District
is subject to cancellation by the parties.

Furthermore,

the price to be charged for the water that is delivered
is almost exclusively at the discretion of the Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District.

Thus White City Water

Company is under constant threat of either discontinuance
of this service or the pricing of the service at a level
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which is unacceptable to White City Water Company and its
customers who would bear the ultimate responsibility of
paying for these services through higher rates.
9.

White City Water Company has attempted to

get permission to construct additional storage facilities
on property which it owns in Sandy City and which is of
sufficient elevation to provide adequate pressure.

Sandy

City, however, has been unwilling to grant a variance from
zoning ordinances to permit the construction of such storage
facilities and this Commission has declined to use its authority,
if such authority it has, to compel Sandy City to grant
such variance.

White City Water Company has explored other

sites outside Sandy City as a possible location for constructing
new storage facilities; however, all such available sites
are expensive to purchase, remote from the White City Water
Companyfs distribution system and its wells and would entail
the expenditure of money beyond the present resources of
White City Water Company.

If it were possible to borrow

funds for such construction, it would require substantially
higher rates from the customers of White City Water Company
in order to service the debt and amortize the investment
of such additional storage facilities.
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10.

Sandy City already has in existence or under

construction sufficient storage facilities to provide adequate
volume and pressure for White City Water Ccmpany customers
if operation of the two systems were integrated.
11.

While White City Water Company customers

now pay generally lower rates than Sandy City charges to
its customers for similar service/ this situation will not
prevail for long if White City must continue to render the
service to its customers on its own.

The cost of maintaining

an aging system and the cost of required new facilities
as above described will in the near future require White
City Water Company to raise its rates substantially for
it to continue as a viable corporation.
12.

The water systems cf White City Water Company

and Sandy City are well matched for integration.

The approval

of this application is in the public interest and will result
in better service to all customers of White City Water Company
and Sandy City in the foreseeable future.
13.

As part of the terms of the agreement, the

White City Water Company wll remain intact as a corporation
over the life of the bonds which the municipal building
authority of Sandy City proposes to issue to raise capital
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for the acquisition of the stock of White City Water Company.
Sandy City, however, will operate the two systems on an
integrated basis and requests an order from this Commission
to the effect that such an integrated system will be considered
a municipal system in its entirety under the laws of the
State of Utah and thus be exempt pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 174A-13-914(3) from the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission of Utah.
WHEREFORE, applicant prays that this matter be
set down for hearing and that upon such hearing the Commission
approve the contract described above and find that the integrated
system constitutes a municipal water system under the laws
of the State of Utah.
DATED this

31st

day of^tfctbber, 1991./^

Calvin L. Rampton
* ^
Attorney for White City Water Company

-7-

VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH,

) ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE,

)

John E. Papanikolas, being first duly sworn,
deposes and says that I am the President of White City Water
Company, that I have read the foregoing Application and
that the same is true and complete to the best of my knowledge
and belief.

—^7—^ '

——

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this :.^"/ day
of October, 1991.
6'
<^j

s?S-

N o t a r y P u b l i c ^ ^ > ^ p ^*j<;/^
*>-<^- , ,-•'
R e s i d i n g a t J ^ J z /<?T.^~si / ^ Cs-tt-rtdt /

7

My Commission E x p i r e s :
//

•?/
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